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nalyses of the persuasive effects of media exposure outside the laboratory have generally produced negative results. I attribute such nonfindings in part to carelessness regarding the inferential consequences of measurement error and in part to limitations of research design. In an analysis of opinion change during the 1980 presidential campaign, adjustingfor measurement error produces several strong media exposure effects, especiallyfor network television news. Adjusting for measurement error also makes preexisting opinions look much more stable, suggesting that the new information absorbed via media exposure must be about three times as distinctive as has generally been supposed in order to account for observed patterns of opinion change.
T he state of research on media effects is one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science. The pervasiveness of the mass media and their virtual monopoly over the presentation of many kinds of information must suggest to reasonable observers that what these media say and how they say it has enormous social and political consequences. Nevertheless, the scholarly literature has been much better at refuting, qualifying, and circumscribing the thesis of media impact than at supporting it. As Graber put it: "The findings that media effects were minimal were so pervasive in early research that after an initial flurry in the 1940s and 1950s, social science research into mass media effects fell to a low ebb. In study after study dealing with political socialization and learning, the mass media were hardly mentioned as an important factor" (1980, The scholarly effort to document significant media effects has been bedeviled by a variety of methodological difficulties. In aggregate-level time-series analyses, it is usually impossible to distinguish the effects of the media themselves from the effects of the events they report. In individual-level cross-sectional studies, differences in opinions between those exposed to the media and those who remain unexposed may simply reflect preexisting differences between the two groups in political attitudes or characteristics. Self-reports of media exposure may be biased in ways that produce artificial correlations with political opinions, especially when the media exposure questions being used refer to specific candidates or issues. For all of these reasons, findings of significant impacts and minimal effects alike have seldom been wholly convincing.
Experimental research elegantly avoids many of these inferential pitfalls. Thus, it should not be surprising that the most convincing demonstrations of media exposure effects to date have come from laboratory settings (Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987) . Nevertheless, experimental methods have their own considerable limitations, primarily with respect to external validity. For this reason, if no other, it behooves us to explain-and to reassessthe pervasive pattern of negative findings and nonfindings in the nonexperimental literature on media effects.
The present work attributes this pervasive pattern of negative findings and nonfindings in part to limitations of research design and in part to carelessness regarding measurement. I do not intend to suggest that all of the findings of minimal effects in the existing scholarly literature are due simply to methodological limitations. Indeed, my own analysis of a varied collection of political opinions and perceptions in one eight-month presidential campaign season provides ample evidence that media exposure only occasionally produces strong, unidirectional opinion changes. Part of my aim in analyzing changes in a broad range of specific campaign opinions and per-be a realistic behavioral model; but it is certainly a useful accounting device-in particular because it provides a systematic way to characterize both the relative weight of old and new information in people's current opinions and the nature and sources of the new information they have absorbed between any two opinion readings.
My model represents an individual i's opinion about some political stimulus j at time t as a Normal probability distribution with mean Oijt and variance l/7rijt. (It may be helpful to think of Oijt as representing the "location" of the opinion and 7ijt as representing the certainty or "precision" of the opinion.) Given Bayesian updating, the relationship between this opinion at time t and the corresponding opinion at any previous time s is where /ijt and wift represent the location and precision, respectively, of a Normal probability distribution representing new information (a "message") received between time s and time t. The precision of the opinion at time t, 7it, is equal to the sum of the prior precision (7ijs) and the message precision (wijt); the location of the opinion at time t, Oijt, is a weighted average of the prior location (%is) and the message location (pijt, each weighted by its relative precision. This model is obviously too general as it stands, since nothing in it is directly observable and everything varies both across individuals and over time. We might make some progress by introducing observable measures of subjective information corresponding to the unobserved variables 7r.. and 7mijt; but the resulting nonlinear model is difficult, in practice, to estimate. In view of this difficulty, a tempting alternative approach is to treat the ratio m.ij/7rijt as a constant parameter Ajt for all i; This assumption implies that individuals vary in how much they know (or rather, in how much they think they know) at any given time, but that the amount of new (subjective) information acquired by any individual in a given time interval is proportional to the amount of (subjective) information that individual already possesses at the beginning of the interval.' Adopting this simplification gives In the first two waves of the 1980 NES survey, respondents were also asked, "Do you read a daily newspaper regularly?" This question was omitted in the third wave of the survey but included again in a fourth (postelection) wave (albeit without the adverb), making it possible to exploit the availability of three-wave panel data for newspaper exposure, as well as television news exposure. Moreover, newspaper reading appears to be a sufficiently stable behavior to warrant using June exposure as a proxy for September exposure in the analysis that follows.5
In order to allow for the importance of partisan learning and reinforcement effects (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Conover and Feldman 1989; Finkel 1990 ), all of the analyses reported here incorporate party identification as an exogenous influence on the nature of the message /ijt received during each time period.6 Partisan predispositions are measured quite reliably by the traditional party identification item in the NES survey7 (recoded here to range from -1 for "strong Democrats" to + 1 for "strong Republicans") and are exceedingly stable over the course of the campaign season.8
Most previous analyses of media exposure effects have been vulnerable to the argument that the apparent effects of media exposure actually reflect the impact of politically relevant social characteristics that happen to be correlated with media exposure. For example, since older people, the well-educated, and blacks are all disproportionately likely to watch television or read newspapers, any systematic opinion changes among these groups might easily be mistaken for effects of media exposure.9 The argument is less compelling when party identification is already included as an explanatory variable, since the most likely source of systematic opinion change among particular groups in a political campaign is partisan "activation" ( However, it would be rash to infer from the prevalence of "insignificant" parameter estimates that there really are no underlying media exposure effects to be found. This is clear from further analysis of the candidate trait variables, where the availability of several measures of essentially similar traits can be exploited to refine the estimates of media exposure effects. For example, treating the "moral," "dishonest," and "power-hungry" traits explicitly as aspects of a more general character dimension makes it possible to estimate the effects of media exposure on perceptions of character more precisely than with the specific responses taken separately. The same is true for a leadership dimension made up of the "weak," "inspiring," and "strong leader" traits and for a competence dimension consisting of the "knowledgeable," "solve economic problems," and "develop good relations" traits. Table 1 presents the results of covariance structure analyses for these three trait dimensions for each candidate. For each trait dimension, estimated effects of television news exposure, newspaper exposure, party identification, and prior opinion comparable to those reported in Appendix B are presented both for June (top) and September (bottom). Additional details of the covariance structure analysis, including the estimated relationships between each general trait dimension and its specific observable indicators, are reported in Appendix C.
Grouping the character traits into broader evaluative dimensions reduces the average standard error of the media exposure parameter estimates by almost a third. The result is to highlight the general pattern of media exposure effects already evident in Appendix B. Thus, for some trait dimensions, the additional precision of the parameter estimates makes it even clearer in Table 1 sure are much too large to be attributed to mere sampling variability. Even in the case of newspaper exposure, where the effects are generally much smaller than for television news exposure, the three largest of the 12 t-statistics in Table 1 perceptions included in the analysis.20 Since total information is, by definition, the sum of preexisting information and campaign information, the increased weight of preexisting information, once we take account of measurement error, necessarily produces a corresponding decrease in the relative weight of campaign information. The ordinary least squares estimates suggest that on average, more than 80% of the total information that respondents had at the time of the third NES interview in September had been gained since the first interview in February. The implication of these estimates is that campaign impressions dominate electoral politics, at least at the presidential level. By contrast, the errors-in-variables estimates suggest that on average, only a little more than one-third of the total information that respondents had in September had been gained since February. By these latter estimates, most of what people believed about both Carter and Reagan in the midst of the general election campaign was already fixed months earlier, before the public phase of the campaign had even begun. The difference between these two sets of estimates is of profound significance for any understanding of the electoral process. The tendency of measurement error to depress the apparent stability of political opinions has been widely recognized (Achen 1975; Feldman 1989 ). However, the implication of this tendency for analyses of opinion change has not generally been recognized. In terms of the Bayesian model of opinion change proposed earlier, new information must compete with a much greater mass of prior information than has generally been supposed and thus must itself be much more distinctive than has generally been supposed in order to produce the opinion changes that we actually observe. Thus (perhaps counterintuitively), evidence that preexisting opinions are very stable also suggests, albeit indirectly, that the political information required to produce systematic changes in those opinions must be very distinctive.
One advantage of the proposed Bayesian model is that it allows us to characterize precisely the new information, or "messages," required to account for observed opinion change during the course of a campaign. Moreover, the formulation in equation 2 makes it possible to assess how much these messages vary with media exposure, party identification, and other characteristics. When the (hypothetical) messages required to account for observed opinion changes vary systematically with media exposure, the implication is that media users were absorbing distinctive messages unavailable to those who remained unexposed.
This implication of the analysis is elaborated in the remaining columns of Table 2 The individual estimates vary a great deal and most are in any case quite imprecise. But the average difference in the messages received by regular television news viewers and nonviewers over this eightmonth period is clearly on the order of 10 points on the 100-point scale. The corresponding average difference for regular newspaper readers and nonreaders is about half as large, while the average difference attributable to partisan predispositions is on the order of 15 or 20 points on the 100-point scale.23
The standard errors of these "distinctive message" estimates are impossible to calculate directly, since the estimates themselves are based on ratios of correlated parameter estimates from Appendix B. However, a good sense of the sampling variability of the estimates can be built up empirically by repeated sampling from the original correlated distributions. 
CONCLUSION
Attention to the effects of measurement error significantly increases the apparent impact of media exposure on opinion change in a presidential campaign setting. Nevertheless, to the extent that analysts focus upon observable opinion change over relatively short periods of time, the apparent effects of media exposure will often be modest in magnitude even when adjusted for the effects of measurement errornot because the media cannot be persuasive but because opinions at the beginning of a typical presidential campaign are already strongly held and because media messages during the course of the campaign are, in any case, only occasionally sharply inconsistent with those preexisting opinions. By the logic of rational (Bayesian) opinion change, only discrepant messages can produce observable change-and then only in direct proportion to the subjective uncertainty of preexisting opinions.
Media exposure is not directly implicated in the formation of these preexisting opinions themselves. But then, there is no way that it could be, given the nature of the available data.25 A panel spanning eight months is far from a snapshot, but it is too truncated a moving picture to capture the full effect of media exposure on opinions and perceptions that were already well developed at the beginning of this eightmonth period. In the absence of any direct access to the process of opinion formation prior to the campaign season, the most natural supposition is that it, too, was heavily dependent upon media exposure. However, the apparent stability of political opinions in a presidential campaign setting suggests that more direct and convincing demonstrations of significant opinion changes due to media exposure will require data collections spanning considerably longer time periods.
The logic of Bayesian opinion change pursued here also suggests that media exposure is most likely to be consequential (in the sense of producing large observable opinion changes) when prior opinions are weak, most notably for "new" candidates or issues. For this reason, simply as a matter of efficiency, analysts of media effects would do well to focus upon "new"f or "uncrystallized" opinions, even if they are atypical or intrinsically less significant than opinions that are better established and more firmly held.
This point is illustrated in Figure 6 , which compares the estimated sampling distribution of television news "message distinctiveness" for Reagan thermometer ratings between sampling distribution of message distinctiveness between June and September. The central tendencies of the two distributions suggest that the distinctive messages received from network television news were not wildly different for the two parts of the campaign; the medians for the two sampling distributions are 15.7 and 9.9, respectively. However, the sampling distribution for September is so diffuse that it provides little useful information about the real distinctiveness of the message received from television news during the latter part of the campaign. (More than 30% of the mass of the sampling distribution actually falls outside the range of values represented in Figure 6 .) The main cause of this diffuseness is the significantly greater stability of prior opinions about Reagan in September than in June. As a result, the estimated impact of television exposure, which had a t-ratio of 1.8 in June, had a t-ratio of .4 by September-not because there was no impact to be measured, but because the stability of preexisting opinion by September reduced that impact to a level below the threshold of precision of the available data. Attempting to study media impact in settings with very stable prior opinions is a social scientist's equivalent of attempting to count galaxies through the wrong end of a telescope. Finally, the analysis presented here highlights the political significance of distinctive, consistent media messages presented over relatively long periods of time. Many of the media exposure effects evident in the 1980 presidential campaign were not, ultimately, consequential in the final election outcome, either because positive effects in one period canceled out negative effects in another period (as with the effects of television news exposure on perceptions of Carter's competence and job performance) or because similar effects of roughly equal magnitude for both candidates canceled each other out. Consistent, distinctive media messages favoring one side or the other in a political controversy are, by contrast, likely to produce sizable opinion changes over time (Zaller 1992 ). Thus, studies of when and why such consistent, distinctive media messages get produced should be among the highest priorities for research on the political impact of the mass media.
The distinctive campaign messages attributed to media exposure in Table 2 are doubly imprecise, since they compound the imprecision of the estimated media exposure and prior opinion effects in Appendix B. The imprecision of the individual estimates is mitigated, for present purposes, by the consistency of results across a quite varied collection of campaign opinions and perceptions. But for more detailed analyses of specific cases, more precise estimation of the messages received by different survey respondents will be of crucial importance.
Better data will also be required to analyze the distinctive effects of various sorts of direct and indirect media exposure. Obviously, not all of the effects portrayed here are specifically attributable to network news and newspapers, since respondents most exposed to these specific media were probably also most exposed to debates, candidate advertisements, and other sources of campaign information. More elaborate media exposure data will be required to sort out the effects of these various information sources more fully.26 On the other hand, comparisons based upon direct media exposure probably understate to a considerable extent the total impact of the media, since they make no allowance for indirect exposure of the sort posited by Barr's Law.27 Better data may eventually make it possible to trace these indirect effects of the media upon people who are not directly exposed to their distinctive messages.
Much remains to be done. Nevertheless, the view that media exposure has "minimal effects" in political campaigns appears, on the basis of the analysis presented here, to be due in significant part to inattention to the implications of measurement error, combined with the tendency of previous research designs to focus upon significant short-term opinion change in circumstances where such change is likely to be quite modest. More careful analysis, together with an alternative focus upon the distinctiveness of the messages received by people exposed to the media, casts the pervasive political impact of the modern mass media in a clearer light. APPENDIX C Table 1 in the text reports parameter estimates from a covariance structure analysis of candidate traits. The aim of that analysis is to refine the estimated media exposure effects in Appendix B by exploiting the availability of multiple indicators of essentially similar trait dimensions. The estimated factor loadings for the individual trait items are shown in Table C-1. To facilitate comparison between the media exposure effects in Table 1 and those in Appendix B, the factor loadings for each trait dimension in Table C-1 are normalized to have an average absolute value of 1.0. It is clear from the results in Table C-1 that all of the individual trait items are strongly related to the corresponding dimensions in ways that make good substantive sense. Moreover, the patterns of factor loadings are quite similar for the separate analyses of Carter and Reagan traits, except that the leadership dimension had a somewhat stronger impact on responses to the "weak" item for Carter and the "inspiring" item for Reagan. Furthermore (as with the opinion-change models for the individual indicators in Appendix B), these more elaborate dimensional models appear to fit the data well.29 
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1. This assumption is consistent with the empirical literature on learning from the media, which suggests that people who are most informed about public affairs are typically most likely to absorb any given piece of new information (Price and Zaller 1992; Robinson and Levy 1986). It is worth noting that if the assumption held exactly, the unconstrained nonlinear model in which rij. and Vijt are separate variables with parameters to be estimated would be underidentified; indeed, difficulties encountered in estimating the parameters of the unconstrained nonlinear model may be attributable to the approximate correctness of this simplifying assumption for relatively short-term processes of opinion change. The same simplifying assumption would presumably be less adequate for long-term processes of opinion change, where prior certainty (but not receptivity to new information) may be strongly related to age or experience (Achen n.d. 4. These values are too high to be consistent with independent estimates of the size of the audience for network news. Since measurement error models of the sort employed in the following analysis cannot distinguish between stable "true" responses and consistent overreporting of news exposure, the parameter estimates for news exposure effects (but not the estimates of aggregate exposure effects) will be artificially attenuated by the inclusion of some overreporters among those apparently exposed to the news. 10. The parameter estimates associated with these control variables in the opinion change equations are omitted from the tables due to space constraints but are available from the author. It is, of course, conceivable that media exposure could be correlated with unmeasured causes of opinion change even after controlling for party identification, age, race, and education. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to address this remaining potential endogeneity, since any available instrument for media exposure might itself be a direct cause of opinion change. Fortunately, potential biases of this sort seem unlikely to be very important, at least if we interpret the estimated media exposure effects broadly (as including the effects of correlated exposure to other campaign media), rather than narrowly (as specific effects of exposure to network television news and daily newspapers).
11. Issue positions were recoded so that 0 denotes the liberal endpoint and 100 the conservative endpoint of each issue scale.
12. The standard Wiley-Wiley measurement model is augmented here to make ("true") television news exposure in each wave of the panel a function of age, education, race, and party identification in addition to previous television news exposure, and likewise for newspaper exposure. In addition, disturbances for the television news and newspaper exposure equations are allowed to be correlated (though the correlations turn out to be small-.03 in June and -.13 in September).
13. With three waves of panel data for a single variable, the basic Wiley-Wiley model is just identified. Hence it is impossible to test its goodness of fit. Here, the availability of additional data makes it possible to test the goodness of fit of the model; and in every case, the fit is quite good. It is also possible to relax the conventional assumptions somewhatfor example, by allowing measurement error variances to differ across panel waves or by allowing measurement errors for different responses by the same respondent to be correlated. Having explored several modifications of this sort, I found none that produced more than marginal improvements in the statistical fit of the model and none that appreciably changed the substantive results. For example, allowing measurement errors for thermometer ratings of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to be correlated produces an estimated format-induced correlation of .20; but the average difference in the eight estimated media exposure effects resulting from this generalization of the model is only .12. For additional examples of alternative model specifications (again, with no appreciable impact on the substantive results of the analysis), see nn. 12, 28. These results are consistent with those reported by Feldman, who applied the Wiley-Wiley model to a variety of items similar to those used here (party identification, issue positions, and candidate evaluations) using data from a five-wave panel (for which the model was overidentified) and concluded that "the simple measurement model fits very well" (1989, 33, 38) .
14. All of the parameter estimates that I report were produced using the generalized least squares routine in the EQS software package (Bentler 1989) .
15. This classification is imposed purely for descriptive purposes in Figures 1-4 but reappears as the basis for a more explicit dimensional analysis in Table 1. 16. Some perspective on the magnitude of these effects may be gained by noting that in a probit analysis of vote choices, a three-point change in the thermometer rating for either candidate in the last month of the campaign translated into a corresponding change of up to 5 or 6 percentage points in the probability of actually voting for that candidate. Vote choices are not analyzed directly here, because prospective voters were not asked about their vote intentions until the third (September) wave of the 1980 panel.
17. Any comparison of television news and newspaper exposure effects must recognize that many people may "read a daily newspaper regularly" for sports news, horoscopes, and want ads, without paying the least attention to news of national politics and public affairs of the sort primarily featured on the television network news programs. A more precise measure of exposure to a daily newspaper's political news would produce somewhat larger exposure effects but a correspondingly lower estimate of how many people are exposed. Thus, although the differences reported here in estimated exposure effects should not be taken as evidence that print news is inherently less persuasive than broadcast news, they do demonstrate that it is less influential in the aggregate.
18. The individual ordinary least squares parameter estimates summarized in Figures 1-4 Thus, the combined weight attached to the campaign information terms /1ij2 and ij3 is (1 -Aj2)Aj3 + (1 -Aj3) = 1 -Aj2Aj3.
The "campaign information" estimates in Table 2 were calculated by replacing Aj2 and Aj3 in this expression with the corresponding errors-in-variables and ordinary least squares parameter estimates.
21. In the case of party identification, the entries in Table 2 Substituting the corresponding errors-in-variables or ordinary least squares parameter estimates for I3j2' Aj2, I3j3, and Aj3 in this ratio produces the estimated contributions reported in Table 2 of television news exposure, newspaper exposure, and party identification to the cumulative campaign message for each of the 37 separate opinions.
23. Here, as elsewhere, it may be worth noting that the effects of party identification, though large for individual identifiers, are much smaller for the population as a whole, simply because effects on Republicans and opposing effects on Democrats tend to cancel out. Even if every strong partisan absorbed new information 15 or 20 points more favorable toward his or her own candidate than the new information absorbed by "pure" independents, as the results in Table 2 suggest, the corresponding average aggregate impact of this partisan reinforcement would have been only two points or so on the 100-point scale, given the distribution of party identification in 1980. By contrast, the average aggregate impact of television news exposure on the messages received by the population as a whole is on the order of 6 points, and the average aggregate impact of newspaper exposure is on the order of 3 points on the 100-point scale.
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